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ARTICLES
This past August the Illinois Appellate Court, in Yarbrough
v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp.,1 suggested there was never a
need to join, or to continue to join, an agent when pursuing
a vicarious liability lawsuit against its principal.2 Herein, we
review this statement in Yarbrough. We then counsel lawyers
and judges regarding future suits against principals based on
the acts of agents. When it reviews the apparent agent issue
in Yarbrough, perhaps the Supreme Court will clarify when the
joinder of principals and agents may be required.

Suing Principals Alone for
the Acts of Agents
By Jeffrey A. Parness and Alex Yorko*

In Yarbrough, the court ruled that a hospital could be vicariously liable for the acts of the employees of an unrelated, independent clinic under the doctrine of apparent authority. The clinic
was never made a party to the litigation against the principal.
The court relied on Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp. in concluding that the plaintiffs were not required to name the apparent agent as a party.3 But the court noted that in Gilbert, the
issue of whether the apparent agent must be named as a party
when the principal was sued “was not at issue.”4 Additionally,
the court relied on Miyzed v. Palos Community Hosp., a First
District case, where a medical negligence claim was allowed to
move forward against a hospital as the principal for the acts of
a physician who rendered treatment on behalf of an independent medical group “under the doctrine of actual and apparent
agency.”5
The Yarbrough court also looked to the Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions to support the notion that a “principal may be
sued even where the apparent agent is not.”6 The Note accompanying one instruction, 105.11, says the instruction “should
be used where the issue of apparent agency is in dispute, the
principal alone is sued, and the plaintiff alleges reliance upon
a ‘holding out’ on the part of the principal.”7 Thus, in medical
malpractice cases per Yarbrough, plaintiffs do not always have to
name an independent clinic or its employees when attempting
to hold the principal/hospital vicariously liable.8

* Jeffrey A. Parness is a Professor Emeritus and Alex Yorko is a student at Northern Illinois University
College of Law. Thanks to Matt Timko, Academic Technologies and Outreach Services Librarian at NIU,
for his helpful comments.
1. Yarbrough v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 2016 App (1st) 141585, ¶ 43 [hereinafter Yarbrough].
2. Herein, principals and agents include employers and employees. Compare Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 5 (4th Dist. 1993) (“cases recognize the rule of vicarious liability only where a principal and
agent or employer and employee relationship is shown”).
3. Yarbrough, at ¶ 44 (citing Gilbert, 156 Ill.2d 511 (1993)) [hereinafter Gilbert].
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing Miyzed v. Palos Community Hosp., 2016 IL App (1st) 142790, at ¶¶ 23-25 [hereinafter Miyzed]).
6. Id. at ¶ 45.
7. Id. (emphasis added by court).
8. Id. at ¶ 46.
9. Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 156 Ill. 2d 511, 517 (1993) [hereinafter Gilbert].
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In Gilbert, the administrator of a decedent’s estate sued both
a treating physician and a hospital for the wrongful death of
the decedent arising out of negligent emergency room care.9
The physician practiced through a professional medical association whose work in the hospital was considered by the hospital
as the work of an independent contractor, as the association’s
doctors were paid no salary by the hospital.10 After the administrator settled with the doctor, the hospital moved for summary
judgment, arguing there was no vicarious liability as the doctor
was not an agent or employee of the hospital.11 The court held
that “under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can
be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician
providing care at a hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless that patient knows,
or should have known, that the physician is an independent
contractor.”12 The court in Yarbrough correctly observed that
the need for a continuing joinder of the agent was not an issue
in Gilbert.

proceed, holding that the defenses articulated by the doctor in
the first case were “personal” to the doctor and that res judicata
did not bar the claim against the hospital/principal in the second case, citing Section 51 of the ALI Restatement (Second)
of Judgments.16 The court suggested, however, that generally
the dismissal of a claim against an agent with prejudice
compels dismissal of any vicarious liability claim against the
principal.17 This can be read to apply even when there is only
one lawsuit wherein the agent and principal are sued and then
the agent is dismissed. Yet, the court further noted in DeLuna
that “[h]ad plaintiff chosen to do so,” plaintiff could have sued
St. Elizabeth’s “alone” as the doctor “was not a necessary party”
and that “it would be particularly unfair to permit” the hospital
“to avoid liability merely because of its employee’s fortuity
in obtaining an involuntary dismissal from plaintiff’s lawsuit,
where that dismissal did not otherwise absolve the employee
of fault.”18 Thus, DeLuna hints that suing principals alone can
sometimes prompt difficulties for claimants.

In Mizyed, the physician and the related medical association
that treated the plaintiff were not included as parties in a
medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital alleged to be
vicariously liable for the acts of the physician under the actual
and apparent agency doctrines.13 The court granted summary
judgment on behalf of the hospital, which urged successfully
that the physician was not the hospital’s agent, so there could
be no vicarious liability.14

DeLuna was applied by the Second District in 2003 in Sterling
v. Rockford Mass Transit District.19 There, plaintiffs sued a
motorist, as well as a bus company and its driver, for personal
injuries arising from the motorist’s causing the bus to crash
into a restaurant.20 The claims against the bus company were

While unnoted in Yarbrough and Mizyed, the Supreme Court
opinion in DeLuna v. Treister presents difficulties for these
rulings on suing only principals. There, a plaintiff sued a doctor
and a hospital as principal. The claim against the doctor was
dismissed for pleading deficiencies. The hospital, in a refiled
case, then urged that dismissal of the claim against it was
required.15 The court allowed the claim against the hospital to

10. Gilbert, 156 Ill.2d at 515.
11. Id. at 517.
12. Id. at 524.
13. Mizyed, at ¶¶ 23-25.
14. Id. at ¶ 64.
15. DeLuna v. Treister, 185 Ill.2d 565, 571 (1999) [hereinafter DeLuna].
16. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51 (1982)).
17. Id. at 581 (citing Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill.2d 113, 124 (1978) [hereinafter Towns], while positing
that this is because the principal’s liability is “derivative” and the principal and agent “are considered
one and the same tortfeasor”).
18. Id. at 582.
19. Sterling v. Rockford Mass Transit Dist., 336 Ill. App. 3d. 840, 846 (2d Dist. 2003) [hereinafter Sterling].
20. Sterling, at 843.
21. Id.
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based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.21 The plaintiffs
later dismissed the bus driver voluntarily, whereupon the bus
company sought dismissal. As the plaintiffs at the close of
the evidence voluntarily dismissed the bus driver with prejudice, the company urged that it was entitled to a favorable
judgment.22 The court referenced Towns, which said that “in
suits based on respondeat superior, a judgment for either the
employer or the employee, arising out of an action predicated
on the alleged negligence of the employee, bars a subsequent
suit against the other for the same claim of negligence where
the agency relationship is not in question.”23 In Towns, there
was no second lawsuit as in DeLuna, only a “subsequent” claim
presentation against an agent once an earlier claim against the
principal was dismissed and operated as “an adjudication upon
the merits.” This dismissal of the principal led the Towns court
to dismiss the claim against the agent.24
Viewing the issue under res judicata, the Sterling court said
it had to decide “under what circumstances will a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice be deemed an adjudication on the
merits.”25 While the court recognized that although generally
a dismissal of an agent compels a dismissal of any vicarious
liability claim against a principal, “the key inquiry is whether
the defenses articulated by the parties are substantively different.”26 As the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed only the bus
driver without a finding as to his negligence, the Sterling court
ruled there were different defenses.27 Citing DeLuna the court
also said that “had the plaintiffs chosen to do so,” they could
have sued the bus company alone.28

“

The safest road for
plaintiffs is to join
agents when suing
principals, and to
continue joinder until
judgment...

In recognizing that not all judgments dismissing agents “with
prejudice” will prompt claim preclusion defenses for principals,
the Sterling court distinguished between dismissals bearing
or not bearing any “relationship to the actual merits.”29 It
opined that no personal defenses available to agents could be
employed by principals seeking dismissals. Yet the Sterling
court also more broadly ruled that, under DeLuna, plaintiffs
can sue principals alone, so that agents need not be joined.30

The provision in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
utilized in DeLuna, states that an earlier judgment involving an
injured person bars that person from later bringing a related
lawsuit against any other person who may have been responsible unless the later lawsuit is based upon grounds that could
not have been asserted in the earlier action or unless any judgment in the earlier action was based on a defense “personal
to the defendant” in that action.31 Another provision in the
same Restatement, unrecognized in Sterling, effectively states
that a settlement with an agent in a case generally does not
“discharge the liability of any other persons liable for the loss”
who were sued in the case.32 It does not say, however, that an
involuntary dismissal of an agent does not discharge the principal in the same case.

22. Id. at 845.
23. Id.
24. Towns, 73 Ill. 2d at 117 (per Rule 273, a dismissal with prejudice of a claim against a principal for a
discovery violation was an adjudication upon the merits barring a claim against).
25. Id. at 847.
26. Id. at 848.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 849 (citing DeLuna, at 578-579).
30. Id. at 848.
31. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51 (1982).

32. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §50 (1) (1982) (though the settlement by its terms can discarge
others).
33. DeLuna, at 582.
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So, some Illinois precedents support the statement in
Yarbrough that agents need not always be continued in suit
if earlier joined when claims are presented against principals
based on vicarious liability. Yet other precedents indicate that
res judicata can bar claims against principals when agents are
sued and then dismissed based on defenses that are not “personal” to them. Perhaps as well, there can be barriers to suits
against principals when agents are never sued, but would have
had defenses not personal to them if they were sued.
After Yarbrough, what should plaintiffs do? In particular, how
should they differentiate between defenses that are and are not
personal to agents? We suggest the safest road is to join agents
[even those without money] when suing principals and to continue to sue to them until the vicarious liability claims against
the principals are resolved, unless it is absolutely clear or a
court rules the agents are not suable due to their “personal”
defenses.
As to what constitutes a personal defense, we suggest caution.
It clearly does not encompass a defense that absolves the agent
of fault, per DeLuna.33 It likely does not include a defense that
could have absolved the agent of fault if the agent had ever
been sued.34 As well as, for now at least, it does not include a
successful defense of an agent who is sued, where the involuntary dismissal of the agent never prompted for the principal
“the inconvenience of having to prepare for trial,” per Sterling.35
Pleading deficiencies prompting dismissals of agents with
prejudice, as in DeLuna,36 and statute of limitations defenses
prompting dismissals of agents with prejudice, as in Sterling,37
seemingly are “personal” when successfully raised by agents.
Lawyers can find further clarifications on “personal” defenses
of agents in judicial precedents outside of Illinois which
utilize, as did DeLuna, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
(though such precedents are sparse).

without continuing to sue their responsible agents. It states:
“If the action is brought against the primary obligor and judgment is against the injured person, it extinguishes the claim
against the person vicariously responsible if under applicable
law the latter is an indemnitor where liability arises only
when the primary obligor is found to be liable to the injured
person.”38 Here, claimants should distinguish between a
principal’s vicarious liability for an agent and a person’s indemnification liability (e.g., for an insured). More pertinent to
Yarbrough, Section 51 also states that a judgment in favor of an
injured person usually “is conclusive … as to the amount of …
damages,” meaning a later suit (or a continuing suit?) against
the principal will often be precluded.39
The safest road for plaintiffs is to join agents when suing
principals, and to continue joinder until judgment, unless an
agreement on the waiver of a res judicata or similar defense
is obtained. Plaintiffs should not assume that all possibly
nonsubstantive defenses leading to involuntary dismissals of
agents will not impact the continuing claims against principals. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273, utilized in Towns, allows
some involuntary dismissals on procedural (i.e., nonsubstantive) grounds to be adjudications “upon the merits,” especially
where, per Sterling, these dismissals came after the principals
endured “the inconvenience of having to prepare for trial.”

Section 51 of the Restatement presents other traps for claimants who sue principals for vicarious liability without suing or

Written norms are possible when the vicarious liability of a
principal ends with the end of the liability of an agent, whether
due to the nonjoinder of the agent and the running of the
limitation periods, or through a settlement postsuit with the
agent, or due to a dismissal with prejudice postsuit of a claim
against the agent involving no settlement, or otherwise. One
Illinois Supreme Court Rule40 already expressly recognizes
a suit against a principal can continue when an agent is dismissed from the suit due to a failure of reasonable diligence
in service of process (clearly a “personal” defense). As well, an
Illinois Civil Procedure Code provision expressly recognizes “a
judgment in an action brought and conducted by a subrogee”

34. But see DeLuna, at 582 (claimant can sue principal “alone,” without noting explicitly a bar if there was
a defense for the agent that was not personal).
35. Sterling, at 849 (citing Leow v. A&B Freight Line, Inc., 175 Ill.2d 176, 186-187 (1997) [hereinafter
Leow]).
36. DeLuna, at 581.
37. Sterling, at 849 (citing Leow, at 188).
38. Id., at § 51 (3).

39. Id., at § 51 (2).
40. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 103(b).
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by virtue of a subrogation right “is not a bar or a determination
on the merits … in an action by the subrogor to recover” upon
a claim “arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions.”41 Even if there is to be no new general written norm
governing all cases, regardless of any personal or nonpersonal
actual or potential defenses of agents, there should at least be
a new written norm on the effects of settlements with agents
alone, as here there appears significant discord in the Illinois
courts.42

The court in Yarbrough said that generally a claimant need not
join an agent when suing a principal. Yet lawyers in civil cases
alleging vicarious liability of a principal must proceed with
caution regarding nonjoinder of the agent since sometimes there
will operate a res judicata defense. Lawyers should take particular care when settling with defending agents (or even principals
per Towns) when they wish to pursue related vicarious
liability claims against principals (or agents). D

41. 735 ILCS 5/2-403(d) (not saying that a judgment in an action by a subroger will not bar a later action
by a subrogee).
42. See, e.g., McGrath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 36-37 (1st Dist. 2003) (“appears to be a conflict” on
whether a settlement with an agent “extinguished any potential vicarious liability on the part of the
principal”).
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